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The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British Policy towards European
Integration
A -conventional wisdom prevails in the histories of
postwar European integration. The late Jean Monnet, high priest
of the European Movement, and his acolyte Richard Mayne, have
been joined by various European and American scholars in the
1propogation of a persuasive historical orthodoxy. There are 
three assumptions fundamental to this orthodoxy. First,the 
Marshall Plan not only saved Western Europe from political and 
economic ruin after 1947 by helping it to overcome the dollar 
shortage, but created the conditions for international economic 
expansion. Secondly, the Marshall Plan gave material and 
institutional form to the 'European Idea' and established the 
foundations of the European Community by providing participating 
countries with hard currency and by encouraging mutual aid on the 
continent through the O.E.E.C. Thirdly, the British ultimately 
kept aloof from the new Europe because of an anachronistic 
determination to play a world role, albeit at the centre of a 
multiracial Commonwealth rather than at the heart of an Empire.
This paper challenges those assumptions. In particular it 
challenges the assumptions about British policy towards Europe 
after 1947. It is true that (after 1947) the British did 
place the maintenance of their world role at the centre of the 
sterling area above any irreversible commitment to European 
integration. But that decision was not founded upon political 
arrogance. London believed that Europe's dollar problem was part 
of a much wider international disequilibrium the solution of 
which was dependent on sterling-dollar co-operation. A study 























































































































































































of the British approach and suggests that the Marshall Plan • 
failed to bridge Europe's dollar gap.
I
American policy-makers in the State Department launched 
the Marshall Plan in the belief that Europe's postwar dollar 
shortage threatened all the plans made during the Second World 
War for the construction of an open world economy. Their 
anxiety was that without a continuing flow of hard currency 
from the United States, European nations would increasingly 
turn to bilateralism, State trading- and exchange controls 
to eliminate the dollar from intra-European trade. If the 
non-Soviet world, and with it the American economy, were to 
be kept safe for free enterprise, Europe's commitment to 
liberal capitalism had to be guaranteed.
This commitment was to be secured by the transformation 
of Western Europe into an integrated economic community in which 
participating countries would encourage mutual aid, self-help 
and the free flow of men, goods and capital. The hope in 
Washington was that the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery 
Programme (E.R.P.), would correct the imbalance between Europe 
and the Western Hemisphere by stimulating production in 
participating countries on the basis of large dollar grants 
and the liberalisation of trade barriers and exchange controls. 
Further, balance between Europe and the dollar area was to be 
the first step on the road to world-wide convertibility and 
multilateralism. Robert Triffin later emphasised that 



























































































a large and stable area of free trade, gradually
(2)drawing non member countries into its orbit.
American officials envisaged a new international system 
in which Western Europe would become the United States' 
junior partner both in the achievement of multilateralism 
and, of course, in the containment of perceived Soviet 
expansion.
The Marshall Plan rested on two basic assumptions. The 
first was, as Will Clayton told members of the- British 
Cabinet in the summer of 1947, that the dollar shortage
(O )"represented (the) failure of Europe to produce". .
The second was that Britain should lead the process of West 
European integration. American policy-makers felt that the 
events of 1947 - the fuel crisis,
the withdrawal from Greece and Turkey and the convertibility 
crisis - had shown that the United Kingdom's days as a world 
power were past. Yet no other West European Country possessed 
Britain's stability and political influence. The British 
should therefore substitute leadership in Europe for their 
world role.
The British shared neither of these assumptions.First, 
they argued that the dollar shortage was rooted in the collapse 
of the old triangular pattern of international settlements as 
a result of the war. The United States was in 1945 the world's 
greatest supplier of manufactures and capital goods. Western 
Europe, Britain and Japan were heavily dependent on the United 
States for the equipment which would allow their industries 
to operate and for the consumer goods which would provide their 




























































































the war had-reduced the immediate dollar earning capacity of far
Europe were now able to finance their dollar deficits with 
offsetting surpluses. The British maintained that only a return 
to triangular trade could lead to a lasting solution of the 
disequilibrium. Merely increasing European production without 
simultaneously replenishing the hard currency stocks of the 
underdeveloped and developing countries of the far East was an 
inadequate and misconveived policy.
Secondly, from the moment the Marshall Plan was launched the
British struggled against American attempts to confine them to
a European role. London argued that Britain's position at the
centre of the sterling area inevitably gave her a world role
the maintenance of which was essential to the world economy
in general and to the British economy in particular. As the gold
and dollar reserves drained away during the 1947 c onvertibility
crisis the sterling area had come near to disintegration. Studies
in the British Treasury at the same time had concluded that the
collapse of the sterling area would precipitate a global liquidity
(5)crisis and lead to mass unemployment in the United Kingdom.
The 1945-51 Labour Government became convinced after the 
convertibility crisis that the preservation of sterling area 
viability had to be the basis of any initiative designed to 
overcome the dollar shortage. Traditionally Britain had been at 
the centre of the world economy, financing deficits with the West 
by surpluses with the East. The United States should not,
(4)Eastern countries neither Britain nor the nations of Continental
therefore, treat Britain simply
Rather, Washington should be prepared to make special arrangements 
for Britain which, in leading to an expansion of sterling area 




























































































Commonwealth nations, many of which were primary producers. The 
return to triangular trade was to be stimulated by an Anglo- 
American financial partnership. By acting as the world's 
creditor along the lines suggested by Keynes in 1943 and 1944 
the United States could- correct the disequilibrium, so helping 
to shape with Britain an expansionary international economic 
environment in which the Attlee Government's liberal socialism 
could flourish.
American support for sterling area reserves was not 
forthcoming. Indeed, after 1947 Anglo-American economic 
relations were marked by friction as members of the State 
Department and the Economic Co-operation Administration (E.C.A.) 
became increasingly frustrated at Britain's unwillingness to 
inaugurate bold moves to European integration. The British shared 
the American anxiety about Soviet expansion and agreed that 
West European nations should co-operate to offset the power of 
the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. But the United Kingdom believed 
that membership of a closely-knit European community would 
threaten the viability of the sterling area. Since the sterling 
area was in deficit with Belgium and to a less extent with 
Switzerland the area reserves stood to lose large amounts of 
hard currency in any sweeping liberalisation of European 
exchanges. Britain therefore countered American a nd continental 
pressure for integration by sponsoring through the O.E.E.C.(6)
\
an intergovernmental form of West European association which 
would enable her to reconcile her world economic role and her 
commitment to domestic full employment with the imperative 
of European co-operation. The British maintained that they 
would be able to take more chances in Europe if the Americans gave 
some financial ballast to the world's second international 





























































































anxiety abo.ut the level of the sterling area reserves she would
have to keep intact the rigorous system of exchange controls
introduced after the suspension of convertibility in August 1947.
In Washington these British arguments were regarded as pleas
for the support both of doctrinaire socialism and of economic
discrimination. The concessions won for sterling in the European
payments scheme negotiated in 1948 derived not from American
acceptance of international Keynesianism but from British success
in persuading the United States of the sterling area's value to
( 7 )European countries seeking non-dollar sources of supply.
These related disagreements about the adequacy of the Marshall 
Plan in countering the dollar shortage, Britain's determination 
to protect the sterling area and attitude to European 





























































































The events of 1949 were to belie the American view that 
the main cause of the dollar shortage was Europe's failure to 
produce and* justify the British views of the problems facing 
the world economy. The E.C.A. Recovery Guides published in 
June 1949 noted that
(West European) Production is flowing at an increasingly 
rapid rate - bottlenecks to industrial expansion have almost 
everywhere disappeared, inflationary pressures have abated ... 
The European economy seems to be entering a more critical 
phase of development - a phase in which the problems of markets, 
trade, prices, distribution and economic balance take the 
place of production, allocation and rationing. The O.E.E.C. 
countries are thus required, perhaps sooner than anticipated to 
adjust their economies internally, between each other, and 
the rest of the world, particularly with the 'hard currency' 
areas. ̂
In other words, despite their steady success in maintaining 
economic recovery, participating countries had not made great 
strides towards a solution of the dollar gap. Western Europe's 
industrial output for the second quarter of 1949 reached its 
highest point since the war, 117 per cent of the level attained 
in 1938. Yet the overall trade deficit of participating 
countries increased. In the fourth quarter of 1948 the deficit 
was $1.2 billion; for the first quarter of 1949 it stood at 
$1.6 billion. Of the second quarter deficit $1.0 billion was
II




























































































Opportunities for increased dollar earnings were reduced 
in the first half of 1949 by a recession in the United States 
which had started in the latter part of 1948. It has been
estimated that the rate of growth of consumption in the United
( g )States dropped by 6 per cent in 1948. This levelling of
consumer demand precipitated a contraction in the United States 
economy for a period of 11 months, from November 1948 to 
October 1949. Industrial production dropped by 10 per cent, 
while there was a decline of slightly more than 5 per cent in 
the G.N.P.^10)
Although the American recession was mild compared with 
either that of 1929 or 1938 its results both for Marshall Europe 
and for the rest of the world were serious. The fall in 
American prices enabled European countries to import a higher 
volume of goods with the dollars they possessed while making 
European exports throughout North and South America less 
competitive than goods produced in the United States. In 1948 
Europe had imported goods to the value of $4,340 billion from 
the United States. In the first half of 1949 the value of 
European imports from the United States stood of an annual 
rate of $4,703 billion. The buoyancy of imports from, and
the fall in exports to, the dollar area (Europe's share of the 
United States market fell from 15.4 per cent in 1948 to 12.6 
per cent by the end of June 1949) put an increasing strain on 
the reserves of European countries.
The result of Europe's failure in hard currency markets 
in 1949 was the reinforcement of the traditional links maintained 
by participating countries with their overseas dependence and 
with independent sterling area countries. Exports whose prices 



























































































currency areas.' There was, then, no decline in the/level of 
exports from Western Europe in the first half of 1949. Indeed 
by comparison with the second quarter of 1948 exports rose by 
$400 million and by $190 million and $290 million to overseas 
dependencies and participating countries respectively. Noting 
this development the September 1949 Recovery Guides spoke of a
trend towards the compa rtmenthlisation of the Western world's
economy into separate trading areas,
The part played by traditional links between a
Metropolitan country and its currency area in increasing the
flow of exports can be understood best by an examination of
the sterling area. No formal exchange controls operated within
the area. There was a steady outflow of capital from the
United Kingdom to overseas members of the area throughout the
postwar years. Between 1946 and 1949 these capital exports
n  3)totalled £703 millipn. Demand for British goods within
the sterling area therefore remained high and was fuelled by
the existence of the sterling balances, which on 31 December
(1411948 totalled £3,554 million. ' When a buyer's market 
began to replace a seller's market throughout the Western 
Hemisphere, therefore, the United Kingdom was able to shelter 
behind the sterling area and maintain expanding exports and 
full employment. France, Belgium and the Netherlands, also at 
the centre of currency areas, repeated this pattern. In 1948 
supplies from European countries occupied 75 per cent of 
all exports to overseas dependencies: in the first half of 1949 
the European share increased to 79 per cent.
This trend towards compartmentalization was encouraged as 
the American recession made it difficult for raw material 
producers in the Far East to earn dollars. By the third 




























































































fallen about 35 per cent below their level in 1948. The lack of 
demand pushed down the price of rubber in New York from 22 cents 
a pound to 16% cents, while the volume was 25 per cent below 
the 19 4 8* average. Malaya, a member of the sterling area, 
suffered most from the cut in American rubber imports and sent to 
the United States in 1949 only one-half of the volume of rubber 
it had supplied in 1948. Malaya's quarterly dollar earnings from 
the export of rubber in 194 8 had averaged about $4 5 million. For 
the first three quarters of 1949 the figures were respectively 
$39.7 million, $27.4 million and $20.4 million.^^^ Throughout 
the sterling area producers of raw materials and manufactured 
goods encountered similar problems. Dollar earnings in the 
overseas sterling area declined by 21 per cent in the second quarter 
of 1949 and by 41 per cent in the third quarter. As the amount 
of hard currency flowing into the central reserves declined so 
member countries were forced to reduce their imports from the 
dollar area, by 25 per cent, in July 1949.
By the spring of 1949 it was clear that Europe's achievement 
of dollar viability by 1952 was in jeopardy. Indeed, the recession 
only highlighted the central weakness of the Marshall Plan: 
the assumption that with higher production Europe would be able 
to balance its trade with the United States. At the best of times 
European exports to the United States would tend to be 
uncompetitive because of the great strides in productivity made by 
American industry during the war. The recession exacerbated this 
structural problem facing European governments and businessmen.
Given the absence of any mechanism to pump dollars into the Far East 
it was not surprising that higher European production tended to 



























































































that outside Eastern Europe at least two and possibly three 
trading areas might develop: a dollar bloc centred on the
United States, and a sterling bloc centred on the United Kingdom, 
while it was ‘uncertain whether continental Europe would become 




























































































The trend towards the establishment of separate trading 
areas sent a frisson through the American establishment. On 
17 March 1949 Paul Hoffman, E.C.A. Administrator, told Averell 
Harriman, the Special Representative in Paris, that the expansion 
of European exports to soft currency areas underscored the fact 
that European currencies were overvalued vis a vis the dollar. Hoffman 
argued that
Such overvaluation provides incentives .that work against 
basic E.C.A. objectives. Imports from the dollar area 
are made cheap and European exports to soft currency areas 
tend to yield higher local currency prices than exports 
to dollar area.^y^
Hoffman recorded that discrimination against American businessmen 
by European countries, stemning from the fall in dollar revenues, 
was causing political problems in the United States. The
remedy lay in a general devaluation of European currencies to 
bring European prices in line with American. Exports to the 
Western Hemisphere would expand, discriminatory practices cease 
and the trend to soft currency blocs would oe reversed.
A consensus developed between the State Department, the
U.S. Treasury and E.C.A. that sterling was the key to the
( 1̂ )necessary adjustment in European exchange rates. First,
about 50 per cent of the world's visible and invisible trade was 
conducted in sterling; and secondly, most Marshall countries would 






























































































American attempts to hustle the I.M.F. into calling for a 
review of European exchange rates in the spring of 1949 were 
beaten off by the British, who viewed the prospect with alarm.^0) 
The passage of a resolution in the Fund which accounted to a 
call for the devaluation of sterling would not remain secret for 
long. Sterling would begin to look a poor investment. Importers 
wishing to purchase sterling area products would hold off in the 
expectation of concluding a better deal. British foreign trade 
would suffer and export earnings sag.
Although the United States became more discrete in its calls 
for a review of European exchange rates it had a second string 
to its bow in the drive to reduce the difference in costs and 
prices between participating countries and the Western Hemisphere. 
This second string took the form of an attempt to improve Marshall 
Europe's competitiveness by liberalising the intra-European 
payments arrangements made in 1948. Bilateral drawing rights 
should be replaced either by convertible or by transferable drawing 
rights so that participating countries could purchase goods in the 
cheapest markets. British producers in particular would then be 
subject to genuine competition in Europe and would be forced 
to adjust costs and prices. If drawing rights were convertible 
participating countries could use them to finance dollar imports, 
leaving European producers competing not just with each other but 
also with American businessmen. The forced re-entry of the dollar 
into intra-European trade through a revised payments scheme 
would be both a spur to efficiency and a decisive move in the 
direction of an open world economy.
Proposals for convertible drawing rights were effectively 




























































































There was a- general anxiety that convertible drawing rights would
stimulate a competitive scramble for hard currency in Marshall
( 21 )Europe. O.E.E.C. nations would reduce imports on intra-
European account to save currency to finance dollar supplies.
American businessmen might find outlets but commerce among
O.E.E.C. members would fall into a downward spiral at a time
when unemployment stood at 1 million in West Germany, at almost
10 per cent in Belgium and when deflation in Italy was sharp
(22)enough to cause even E.C.A. concern. '
E.C.A. thus withdrew its proposals for'convertibility. But 
pressure for transferable drawing rights was maintained. The 
Americans were supported by Belgium and Switzerland, both all-round 
creditors in Marshall Europe. Under existing bilateral agreements 
both countries stood to gain dollars from the transfer of other 
European currencies to their accounts. Once again, however, the 
British fought against the plan. The proposals came at a bad time 
for London. British exports to the United States fell throughout 
the spring and sterling area sales slumped as a result of the 
American recession. The strain on the reserves was intensified 
by heavy transfers of gold to Switzerland and Belgium, totalling 
£22.4 million, arising from the first Intra-European Payments 
Scheme. By the end of June 1949 the British reserves had 
fallen to £406.4 million with the downward trend likely to continue 
in the absence of any upturn in the American economy.' 0> 
Transferability would place further pressure on the reserves 
since Belgium and Switzerland could pile up sterling beyond 



























































































A stalemate which might have prejudiced Congressional 
support for continued Marshall aid was only averted by E.C.A. 
pressure on the O.E.E.C. and by a compromise, favourable to 
Britain, drawn up by Robert Marjolin. British drawing rights 
on Belgium were increased from $30 million to $85 million. It 
was further agreed that in the new payments scheme only 25 per 
cent of all drawing rights would be transferable.
These new intra-European payments arrangements were far
removed from the original E.C.A. proposals. The new scheme
would ensure some flexibility between participating countries
but American attempts to force a readjustment of European costs
.and prices had been largely thwarted by Britain's determination
to protect her reserves. The anti-climactic result of
America's crusade for liberalisation suggested that a solution
to the rapidly developing sterling area dollar crisis was a




























































































On the basis of discrimination against the dollar, a
domestic full employment policy and American assistance
through Marshall aid, Britain had achieved striking successes in
economic policy by 1949. Whereas the volume of exports in
1945 had been 50 per cent below the level reached in 1938 it
stood 55 per cent higher in 1949, financing 85 per cent of
Britain's imports as opposed to 33 per cent. No other country
in Marshall Europe could match this record; and not even the
Americans had increased output per man-hour as rapidly since
(25 )the war as had the British. But the sterling crisis of
summer 1949 threatened to undermine British reconstruction. By 
16 June Britain's dollar drain was running at an annual rate of 
£600 million.v ' With the reserves facing exhaustion by the 
end of the year the Cabinet was forced into a major reconsideration 
of policy.
The options facing the Labour Government were presented by 
Chancellor Sir Stafford Cripps to the Cabinet's Economic Policy 
Committee on 7 July. Cripps stated that
the policy of trying to compromise between tying ourselves 
to the United States economy on the one hand and, on the 
other, keeping ourselves insulated from it by bilateral 
agreements and other means, had proved to be ineffective 
in protecting us from the effect of change in the American 
level of demand. We must contemplate similar fluctuations 
in the American economy in the future and should have to 
decide whether, in spite of these fluctuations, we should 
try to find some long-term basis on which we should try to 
associate outselves with it, or whether we should try to
isolate the sterling area from it and preserve stability within 





























































































These two options were called respectively a 'one-world' 
and a 'two-world' policy. A 'one-world' policy involved 
rapid movement towards convertibility and multilateralism and the 
dismantling of trade and exchange controls. A 'two-world' policy 
involved the construction of a fortress sterling area on the basis 
of bilateral trade and payments agreements abroad and at home 
a direction of labour, price controls and extensions of rationing. 
It implied, therefore, the division of the non-communist world 
into two major trading blocs based on the two principal 
international reserve currencies. Whereas a 'two-world' approach 
might preserve a high level of employment at the expense of 
living standards a 'one-world' approach would-risk exposing 
Britain to the full impact of cyclical recessions in the American 
economy whilst preserving
the essential political and strategic requirements of
this country as represented by the North Atlantic Pact,
(28 )Western Union and Commonwealth solidarity.
The British decided not to attempt the creation of an 
insulated sterling bloc but to work towards a 'one-world' economy. 
This was partly to preserve the emerging postwar Atlantic Alliance. 
But it was also felt that under certain conditions a 'one-world' 
policy need not involve any sacrifice of the Government's domestic 
and international economic objectives. These conditions centred 
on America's willingness to be a 'good creditor'. Being a good 
creditor meant fighting the dollar shortage through commitments to 
the preservation of high levels of internal demand, increased 
foreign investment and discussions with Britain on joint Anglo- 




























































































When Cripps put the essentials of the British plan for an
expansionary 'one-world' economy to American Treasury Secretary
John Snyder during informal talks at the start of July he did
(29)not meet with warm approval. Snyder was more concerned with
the steady pressure of rising costs in the British economy, making 
exports, he claimed, uncompetitive in hard currency markets. 
Overheating in the British economy was in the American view the 
central factor in the sterling area's growing isolation from the 
world economy.^ For the Americans, this growing isolation was
exemplified in the $700 million cuts in Western Hemisphere imports 
agreed in July by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers.
Snyder's visceral American distrust for socialism led him to 
ignore the successful record of the British export drive. He 
showed no sign of accepting that the American recession might have 
much to do with British difficulties. At the same time, however, 
there was evidence that British goods were overpriced. At the 
meeting of Commonwealth finance Ministers Edgar Whitehead of 
Southern Rhodesia produced figures showing the relative values 
of British and American exports. Whitehead's statistics
revealed the British products were becoming dangerously
.... (31)uncompetitive.
The failure of the Cripps-Snyder talks did not discourage 
the Labour Government in its search for a world economy which 
reconciled full employment with multilateralism. A 'one-world' 
economy, indeed, squared with the fundamental liberalism of 
the Attlee Government. Confronted by Whitehead's evidence 
the Cabinet decided to devalue the pound in the hope that the 
subsequent readjustment of British prices would induce the United 
States to play its part as the world's creditor. At a Cabinet 
discussion on 28 July it was suggested that "it might prove 



























































































co-operation in establishing a satisfactory and enduring
relation between the sterling and dollar worlds unless
(3 2)some concession could be made to their point of view. “
In any case,' with the reserves falling below £370 million by 
the end of July, devaluation had become economically as well 
as politically inescapable. The reserves were so low by July 
and August that even the taking of the ’one-world1 option 
would provide no alternative to large-scale unemployment. The 
sterling devaluation was to be large, of 30 per cent, from 




























































































Cripps and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin embarked for
Washington, for further talks on the dollar problem, in
September 1949. They took with them not just the commitment
to devalue but pledges to review public spending and improve
industrial efficiency. When the British revealed this package
to the Americans they met with a favourable response.. The
Truman Administration, worried by rising unemployment, had
(33)already determined to expand the economy. On hearing
of the British plans American officials agreed to resume raw 
material stockpiling, reduce tariffs and increase foreign 
investment in addition to maintaining a high level of internal 
demand. Further, a special organisation was to be established 
for the continuous discussion and review of economic problems 
common to the United States, Britain and Canada. Sir Oliver 
Franks, British Ambassador in Washington, cabled that "a real 
conviction" had arisen from the talks that the countries 
represented there
have it in their power to remake the economic and trade 
pattern of the Western world if they can agree together
and .... as a result of the week's work such agreement
will be possible. It was clear that the Americans 
decided to regard us once more as their principle
partner in world affairs, and not just as a member of
, ( t 4)the European queue.
It appeared that the British had succeeded where they had failed 
in the Summer of 1947. Finally embracing international 
Keynesianism the United States had been persuaded to undertake 





























































































policies which Would underwrite sterling's world role. Not only 
London but now Washington seemed to feel that the Marshall Plan 
was an inadequate response to the dollar shortage. If the wider 
solution based on Anglo-American economic co-operation apparently 
heralded by the Washington talks was to be pursued, the United 
States would cease pressing Britain to participate in schemes 
to further European integration which jeopardised her reserves.
The impact of the talks on British policy towards Europe was
considerable. The improvement in Anglo-American relations took
place at a time when relations between Britain hnd some of her
partners in the O.E.E.C. had deteriorated. The British complained
bitterly over the size or the O.E.E'.C.'s allocation "to them of
Marshall aid for 1949-50. Alarmed by the dollar drain they revised
their estimate of the sterling area dollar deficit for 1949-50
upwards from $950 million to $1,500 million. But the Programmes
Committee appeared willing to allocate Britain just $850 million.
When other participating countries put in bids which had also
been revised upwards (though not as dramatically as the British
bid) as the dollar gap widened, it seemed that the O.E.E.C. might
be unable to agree on the division of aid. In the end only
threats by Paul Hoffman about the consequences of continued
disagreement on Congressional and public opinion in the United
States brought the dispute to a close. Britain reluctantly
(35)accepted a compromise by which she received $962 million.
The British economic crisis was therefore a major cause of 
the summer's problems within the O.E.E.C. London's stance on 
the Intra-European Payments Scheme and on the division of aid, 
together with the prospect of Anglo-American economic talks in 
September, worried some participating countries. The French, 




























































































to resurgent German power, were particularly concerned. They tried 
unsuccessfully to become associated with the Washington talks. 
Following the devaluation of sterling on 18 September the French 
accused Britain of undermining European integration by 
settling mattters central to the economic stability of
(37)O.E.E.C. members in secret session with the Americans.
Confronted with growing evidence of Anglo-American rather than 
Anglo-European co-operation France joined the participating 
countries most committed to integration by devising a scheme 
from which Britain would be excluded. The countries most 
involved were France, Belgium and Italy. The scheme, known by 
the British as the 'Alphand Plan', included interconvertibility 
of members' currencies, fluctuating exchange rates to provide for 
automatic adjustments to disequilibria, and preferential trading 
arrangements. E.C.A. strongly supported the plan, seeing in 
it the core of a European union.
The emergence of the Alphand Plan was clear evidence that
the British policy of controlling the pace of European
nok u)U'uJ/d/Y'integration through the O.E.E.C. was beginning to falter. But
the sterling devaluation upset the currency plans of France,
Belgium and Italy. As American policy-makers had anticipated
in the spring most participating countries were left with little
choice but to devalue their own currencies in response to the
sterling-dollar readjustment. Progress with the Alphand Plan
had to wait upon this wider readjustment. Thè British were
relieved at the apparent demise of the Alphand Plan. They feared
first that the Plan's implementation would lead to the
appearance of disorderly cross rates and encourage speculation
against sterling and secondly that it heralded their exclusion




























































































Encouraged by the Washington talks and by the emergence
of what appeared to be an anti-British conspiracy in Marshall
Europe the Labour Government elaborated the 'limited liability'
* (3 9)policy developed in January 1949. 'Limited liability'
meant making no irreversible commitment to European integration. 
In October 1949 Bevin argued that Britain should specifically 
work against the development of a European bloc . separate from 
the United States. Such a grouping would be strategically 
vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Nothing should be done to 
undermine the pivotal position of the Atlantic Pact in holding 
the West together and in committing the United States to 
European defence. Britain should therefore encourage the 
development of a Western association within which she would lean 
more towards the United States and the Commonwealth than towards 
integration with Europe. On 27 October Bevin informed the 
Cabinet that
as a result of the Washington talks and of the Commonwealth 
Finance Minister's meeting, we have established or are 
establishing a new relationship with the United States 
and with the rest of the Commonwealth (sic). Our 
relations with those areas take priority over our 
relations with Europe and for that reason alone there 
is a limit to the part we can play in 'European Union'.
The Atlanticist shape of British foreign policy had two basic 
supports. Strategy and economics went hand in hand. The 
Anglo-American military and political alliance, deemed central 
to Western security, was paralleled by the understanding 
between the sterling and dollar areas which removed Britain 




























































































Such was the view from London. In Washington the State
Department had finally accepted that Britain's world economic
role would prevent her from participating fully in European
integration. Dean Acheson argued that France now held the key
to European unity, which could only be achieved on the basis
( 41 )of a Franco-German rapprochement. Acheson did however
believe that Britain should not merely give sympathetic consider­
ation to schemes for European integration. Rather, London should
positively encourage the creation of a West European community




























































































The new American policy faced the British with the dilemma
they had been trying to escape ever since Bevin's Western
Union speech in January 1948. Abstention from European
Union might lead to the emergence of a protected, powerful
industrial competitor. Involvement would prejudice British
control over their own financial and economic policies. That much
had been made clear by the wrangles over the Intra-European
Payments Schemes. The point was driven home in the first months
of 1950 by the long and difficult negotiations designed to
establish the European Payments Union. ‘ In early 1950, therefore,
the British launched the concept of an Atlantic Community. The
Atlantic Community was the logical development of Bevin's Western
Union policy. All the countries of Marshall Europe could be
brought under the umbrella of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
whose function would be extended from the military into the
economic sphere. French fears of a revived Germany would be
reassured by the presence of Britain and America in the Organisation,
which would not involve Britain in a closely integrated Europe.
At the same time the Atlantic Community would develop the new
sterling-dollar relationship achieved at Washington in September
1949. The health of the sterling area was to be central to the
well-being of the Community as a whole. By endorsing the Atlantic
Community the United States would be completely committed to
(4 3)supporting Britain's world economic role. And the United
States, alarmed by the loss of momentum in European integration 
revealed early in 1950 by the slow progress of the Payments Union 
talks and by the development of Franco-German antagonism, 






























































































But the Atlantic Community could not accommodate the 
interests of several leading Marshall countries committed to 
European integration. France, Italy and Benelux had never been 
satisfied by Britain's wide and loose concept of Western 
co-operation. Furthermore the Atlantic Community offered only 
a slow and clumsy solution to the Franco-German problem. The 
Schuman Plan, however, cut through these complications. It 
answered the needs both of the State Department and of the most 
committed European countries. Washington abandoned the Atlantic 
Community and the British were faced with the irreversible 
commitment to European integration they had decided never to make. 
The Schuman Plan clearly heralded the two-tier development of 
Western Europe over the subsequent generation, in the E.E.C. 
under a Franco-German leadership and in N.A.T.O. along an 
Anglo-American axis.
The Marshall Plan might have provided a framework for
European integration but it did not lead to the closing of the
dollar gap. In 1947 the American surplus with the rest of the
world had been $8 billion; in 1949 it remained above $4 billion.
Acheson asked President Truman in February 1950
as E.R.P. is reduced and after its termination in 1952,
how can Europe and other areas of the world obtain the
dollars necessary to pay for a high level of United
States exports, which is essential both to their own
basic needs and to the well-being of the United States 
(44 )economy?
At the start of 1950 one-third of America's exports of $16 billion 
were financed through foreign assistance. On the termination 



























































































The Marshall Plan, as the 1949 crisis showed, merely created 
the conditions for the establishment of an autarkic Western 
Europe. British criticisms of the Plan were largely 
justified. Yet the pursuit of multilateralism through 
sterling-dollar co-operation was effectively abandoned with 
the onset of the Korean War.
In 1950 and after, however, the United States did pump 
dollars into the underdeveloped nations of the Far East.
The rearmament programme, given a powerful impetus by the 
Korean War, set off a return to triangular trade. The United 
States' enthusiastic performance as world policeman finally 
closed the dollar gap and stimulated international economic 
expansion. Economic equilibrium was founded upon political 
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